EIP-3779: Safer Control Flow for the EVM
Ensure an essential level of safety for EVM code.
Author | Greg Colvin, Greg Colvin, Brooklyn Zelenka |
---|---|
Discussions-To | https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/eip-3779-safe-control-flow-for-the-evm/6975 |
Status | Draft |
Type | Standards Track |
Category | Core |
Created | 2021-08-30 |
Requires | 2315, 3540, 3670, 4200 |
Table of Contents
Abstract
We define a safe EVM contract as one that cannot encounter an exceptional halting state. In general, we cannot prove safety for Turing-complete programs. But we can prove a useful subset.
This EIP specifies validity rules to ensure that:
Valid contracts will not halt with an exception unless they either
- throw
out of gas
or- recursively overflow stack.
This EIP does not introduce any new opcodes. Rather, it restricts the use of existing and proposed control-flow instructions. The restrictions must be validated at contract initialization time – not at runtime – by the provided algorithm or its equivalent. This algorithm must take time and space near-linear in the size of the contract, so as not to be a denial of service vulnerability.
This specification is entirely semantic. It imposes no further syntax on bytecode, as none is required to ensure the specified level of safety. Ethereum Virtual Machine bytecode is just that – a sequence of bytes that when executed causes a sequence of changes to the machine state. The safety we seek here is simply to not, as it were, jam up the gears.
Motivation
Safety
For our purposes we define a safe EVM contract as one that cannot encounter an exceptional halting state. From the standpoint of security it would be best if unsafe contracts were never placed on the blockchain. Unsafe code can attempt to overflow stack, underflow stack, execute invalid instructions, and jump to invalid locations.
Unsafe contracts are exploits waiting to happen.
Validating contract safety requires traversing the contract code. So in order to prevent denial of service attacks all jumps, including the existing JUMP
and JUMPI
, and also the other proposed jumps – RJUMP
, RJUMPI
, RJUMPV
, RJUMPSUB
and RETURNSUB
– must be validated at initialization time, and in time and space linear in the size of the code
Dynamic jumps, where the destination of a JUMP
or JUMPI
is not known until runtime, are an obstacle to proving validity in linear time – any jump can be to any destination in the code, potentially requiring time quadratic in the size of code. We use a linear-time, linear-space symbolic execution of the code to treat some of these jumps as static, and the rest as invalid.
Dynamic Jumps, Static Jumps, and Subroutines
Dynamic jumps need not always impede control-flow analysis. In the simplest and most common case
PUSH address
JUMP
is effectively a static jump.
Even where jumps are dynamic it is possible to statically constrain their range by enumerating valid destinations in advance, as per the proposed RJUMPV
instruction.
Another important use of JUMP
is to implement the return jump from a subroutine. So consider this example of calling and returning from a minimal subroutine:
TEST_SQUARE:
jumpdest
push RTN_SQUARE
0x02
push SQUARE
jump
RTN_SQUARE
jumpdest
swap1
jump
SQUARE:
jumpdest
dup1
mul
swap1
jump
The return address -RTN_SQUARE
- and the destination address - SQUARE
- are pushed on the stack as constants and remain unchanged as they move on the stack, such that only those constants are passed to each JUMP
. They are effectively static. We do not need unconstrained dynamic jumps to implement subroutines.
Finally, the static relative jumps of EIP-4200 and the simple subroutines of EIP-2315 provide static jumps directly.
So we can validate the safety of contracts with a static analysis that takes time and space linear in the size of the code, as shown below. And since we can, we should.
Performance
Validating safe control flow at initialization time has potential performance advantages.
- Static jumps do not need to be checked at runtime.
- Stack underflow does not need to be checked for at runtime.
Specification
Validity
In theory, theory and practice are the same. In practice, they’re not. – Albert Einstein
We define a safe EVM contract as one that cannot encounter an exceptional halting state. We validate safety at initialization time to the extent practical.
Exceptional Halting States
The execution of each instruction is defined in the Yellow Paper as a change to the EVM state that preserves the invariants of EVM state. At runtime, if the execution of an instruction would violate an invariant the EVM is in an exceptional halting state. The Yellow Paper defined five such states.
- Insufficient gas
- More than 1024 stack items
- Insufficient stack items
- Invalid jump destination
- Invalid instruction
A program is safe iff no execution can lead to an exceptional halting state.
We would like to consider EVM programs valid iff they are safe.
In practice, we must be able to validate code in linear time to avoid denial of service attacks. And we must support dynamically-priced instructions, loops, and recursion, which can use arbitrary amounts of gas and stack.
Thus our validation cannot consider concrete computations – it only performs a limited symbolic execution of the code. This means we will reject programs if we detect any invalid execution paths, even if those paths are not reachable at runtime. And we will count as valid programs that do not in fact produce correct results.
We can detect only non-recursive stack overflows at validation time, so we must check for the first two states at runtime:
out of gas
and- stack overflow.
The remaining three states we can check at validation time:
- stack underflow,
- invalid jump, and
- invalid instruction.
That is to say:
Valid contracts will not halt with an exception unless they either
- throw
out of gas
or- recursively overflow stack.
Constraints on Valid Code
- Every instruction is valid.
- Every jump is valid:
- Every
JUMP
andJUMPI
is static. - No
JUMP
,JUMPI
,RJUMP
,RJUMPI
,RJUMPV
, orRJUMPSUB
addresses immediate data.
- Every
- The stacks are always valid:
- The number of items on the
data stack
is always positive, and at most 1024. - The number of items on the
return stack
is always positive, and at most 1024.
- The number of items on the
- The data stack is consistently available:
- The
available items
on thedata stack
are always positive, and the same number of items are available for every execution of a particular byte_code.
- The
We define a JUMP
or JUMPI
instruction to be static if its jumpsrc
argument was first placed on the stack via a PUSH…
and that value has not changed since, though it may have been copied via a DUP…
or SWAP…
.
The RJUMP
, RJUMPI
and RJUMPSUB
instructions take their destination as an immediate argument, so they are static. The RJUMPV
instructions take an index on the stack at runtime, and proceed via the jumpdest
indexed in the jump vector, or else via its first, default jumpdest
. In this way RJUMPV
is constrained to be static, as the programmer must provide a default case, and all cases are validated.
The Yellow Paper has the stack pointer
(SP
) pointing just past the top item on the data stack
. We define the available items
as the number of stack items between the current SP
and the SP
on entry to the most recent basic block.
Taken together, these rules allow for code to be validated by traversing the control-flow graph, in time and space linear in the size of the code, following each edge only once.
Rationale
Demanding static destinations for all jumps means that all jump destinations can be validated at initialization time, not runtime.
Bounding the stack pointers catches all data stack
and non-recursivereturn stack
overflows.
Requiring consistently available items
on the data stack
prevents stack underflow. It can also catch such errors as misaligned stacks due to irreducible control flows and calls to subroutines with the wrong number of arguments.
And relative rather than absolute jump destinations are consistent with the other RJUMP
instructions, so that code remains position-independent.
Note: The definition of *static* here is the bare minimum needed to implement subroutines. Deeper analyses could be proposed that would validate a larger and probably more useful set of jumps, at the cost of more expensive (but still linear) validation.
Note: Requiring the valid destinations of dynamic jumps to be enumerated at every jump instruction allows for tractable bytecode validation: a jump vector takes up space proportional to the number of destinations, so attempting to attack the validation algorithm with large numbers of jumps will proportionally reduce the available space for those jumps.
Reference Implementation
The following is a pseudo-Go implementation of an algorithm for predicating code validity. An equivalent algorithm must be run at initialization time.
This algorithm performs a symbolic execution of the program that recursively traverses the code, emulating its control flow and stack use and checking for violations of the rules above.
It runs in time equal to O(vertices + edges)
in the program’s control-flow graph, where edges represent control flow and the vertices represent basic blocks – thus the algorithm takes time proportional to the size of the code.
Note: Because valid code has a control-flow graph that can be traversed in linear time there are other static analyses and code transformations that might otherwise require quadratic time can also be written to run in linear time, including those which must traverse or construct the control-flow graph.
Validation Function
For simplicity’s sake we assume that jumpdest analysis has been done and that we have a few helper functions.
is_valid_instruction(pc)
returns true ifpc
points at valid instructionis_immediate_data(pc)
returns true ifpc
points at immediate dataimmediate_data(pc)
returns the immediate data for an instruction.advance_pc()
advances the pc, skipping any immediate data.removed_items(pc)
returns the number of items removed from thedata_stack
by an instruction.added_items(pc)
returns the number of items added to thedata_stack
by an instruction.
var code [code_len]byte
var avail_items [code_len]int
var return_stack [1024]int = { -1 }
var data_stack [1024]uint256 = { INVALID }
var control_stack [1024]uint256 = { INVALID }
// return the maximum stack used or else the PC and an error
func validate_path(pc := 0, sp := 0, bp := 0, rp := 0) int, error {
used_items := 0
for pc < code_len {
if !is_valid_instruction(pc) {
return pc, invalid_instruction
}
// if available items on stack for `pc` are non-zero
// we have been here before
// so return to break cycle
if avail_items[pc] != 0 {
// invalid if available items not the same
if avail_items[pc] != sp - bp {
return pc, invalid_stack
}
return used_items, nil
}
avail_items[pc] = sp - bp
if avail_items[pc] < 0 {
return pc, stack_underflow
}
switch code[pc] {
// successful termination
case STOP:
return used_items, nil
case RETURN:
return used_items, nil
case SUICIDE:
return used_items, nil
// track constants on stack
case PUSH1 <= code[pc] && code[pc] <= PUSH32 {
sp++
if (sp > 1023) {
return pc, stack_overflow
}
data_stack[sp] = immediate_data(pc)
advance_pc()
continue
case JUMP:
// will enter basic block at destination
bp = sp
// pop jump destination
jumpdest = data_stack[--sp]
if !valid_jumpdest(jumpdest) {
return return pc, invalid_destination
}
continue;
case JUMPI:
// will enter basic block at destination
bp = sp
// pop jump destination and conditional
jumpdest = data_stack[--sp]
jumpif = data_stack[--sp]
if sp < 0 {}
return pc, stack_underflow
}
if !valid_jumpdest(jumpdest) {
return pc, invalid_destination
}
// recurse to validate true side of conditional
if is_immediate_data(jumpdest) {
return pc, invalid_destination
}
left_used, err = validate(jumpdest, sp, bp, rp)
if err {
return pc, err
}
// recurse to validate false side of conditional
pc = advance_pc(pc)
right_used, err = validate(pc, sp, bp, rp)
if err {
return pc, err
}
// both sides valid, check stack and return used_items
used_items += max(left_used, right_used)
sp += used_items
if (sp > 1023) {
return pc, stack_overflow
}
return used_items, nil
case RJUMP:
// will enter basic block at destination
bp = sp
// check for valid jump destination
if is_immediate_data(jumpdest) {
return pc, invalid_destination
}
// reset pc to destination of jump
pc += immediate_data(pc)
case RJUMPI:
// will enter basic block at destination
bp = sp
// recurse to validate true side of conditional
jumpdest := pc + immediate_data(pc)
if is_immediate_data(jumpdest) {
return pc, invalid_destination
}
left_used, err = validate(jumpdest, sp, bp, rp)
if err {
return pc, err
}
// recurse to validate false side of conditional
pc = advance_pc(pc)
right_used, err = validate(pc, sp, bp, rp)
if err {
return pc, err
}
// both sides valid, check stack and return used_items
used_items += max(left_used, right_used)
if (sp += used_items > 1023) {
return pc, stack_overflow
}
return used_items, nil
case RJUMPSUB:
// check for valid jump destination
jumpdest = imm_data(pc)
if is_immediate_data(pc + jumpdest) {
return pc, invalid_destination
}
// will enter basic block at destination
bp = sp
// push return address and reset pc to destination
return_stack[rp++] = pc + 1
pc += jumpdest
case RETURNSUB:
// will enter basic block at destination
bp = sp
// check for valid return destination
pc = return_stack[--rp]
if !code[pc - 1] == JUMPSUB {
return pc, invalid_destination
sp++
data_stack[sp++] = immediate_data(pc)
pc = advance_pc(pc)
default:
pc = advance_pc(pc)
// apply other instructions to stack pointer
// removed and added items are filled with INVALID
used_items -= removed_items(pc)
used_items += added_items(pc)
sp += used_items
if (sp > 1023) {
return pc, stack_overflow
}
}
}
// successful termination
return used_items, nil
}
Backwards Compatibility
These changes affect the semantics of EVM code – the use of JUMP
, JUMPI
, and the stack are restricted, such that some code that would otherwise run correctly will nonetheless be invalid EVM code.
Security Considerations
This EIP is intended to ensure an essential level of safety for EVM code deployed on the blockchain.
References
Greg Colvin, Martin Holst Swende, Brooklyn Zelenka, “EIP-2315: Simple Subroutines for the EVM,” Ethereum Improvement Proposals, no. 2315, October 2019. [Online serial]. Available: https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2315.
Alex Beregszaszi, Paweł Bylica, Andrei Maiboroda, “EIP-3540: EVM Object Format (EOF) v1,” Ethereum Improvement Proposals, no. 3540, March 2021. [Online serial]. Available: https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-3540.
Alex Beregszaszi, Andrei Maiboroda, Paweł Bylica, “EIP-3670: EOF - Code Validation,” Ethereum Improvement Proposals, no. 3670, June 2021. [Online serial]. Available: https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-3670.
Alex Beregszaszi, Andrei Maiboroda, Paweł Bylica, “EIP-4200: Static relative jumps [DRAFT],” Ethereum Improvement Proposals, no. 4200, July 2021. [Online serial]. Available: https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4200.
Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.
Citation
Please cite this document as:
Greg Colvin, Greg Colvin, Brooklyn Zelenka, "EIP-3779: Safer Control Flow for the EVM [DRAFT]," Ethereum Improvement Proposals, no. 3779, August 2021. [Online serial]. Available: https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-3779.